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CHAPTER 2 
From Gospel to Law:  
The Lutheran Reformation and Its Impact on Legal Culture 
 
John Witte Jr. 
 
Abstract 
The Lutheran Reformation transformed not only theology and the church 
but also law and the state. Despite his early rebuke of law in favor of the Gospel, 
Martin Luther eventually joined up with various jurists and political leaders to craft 
ambitious legal reforms of church, state, and society on the strength of Luther’s 
new theology, particularly his new two kingdoms theory. These legal reforms 
were defined and defended in hundreds of monographs, pamphlets, and 
sermons published by Lutheran writers from the 1520s onward. They were 
refined and routinized in hundreds of new reformation ordinances that brought 
fundamental changes to theology and law, to church and state, marriage and 
family, criminal law and procedure, and education and charity. Critics have long 
treated this legal phase of the Reformation as a corruption of Luther’s original 
message of Christian freedom from the strictures of all human laws and 
traditions. But Luther ultimately realized that he needed the law to stabilize and 
enforce the new Protestant teachings.  Radical theological reforms had made 
possible fundamental legal reforms. Fundamental legal reforms, in turn, would 
make palpable radical theological reforms. In the course of the 1530s onward, 
the Lutheran Reformation became in its essence both a theological and a legal 
reform movement. It struck new balances between law and Gospel, rule and 
equity, order and faith, and structure and spirit. 
Keywords:  Martin Luther; canon law; civil law; two kingdoms theory; marriage; 
family; education; social welfare; charity; church-state relations  
 
On December 10, 1520, Martin Luther burned the canon law books of the 
Catholic Church. A large group of students and colleagues gathered in 
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Wittenberg for the book burning. Consigned to the flames were Gratian’s 
Decretum of 1140 and four thick books of later papal laws. Also cast into the fire 
were a standard confessional book and several tomes on Catholic sacramental 
theology. “This might as well go, too,” Luther muttered as he threw into the fire 
the papal bull that threatened his excommunication for heresy. Luther would later 
write of his canonical bonfire: “I am more pleased with this than any other action 
in my life.”1 
If there were a single event that signaled Luther’s permanent break with 
Rome, this was the event. Three years before, on October 31, 1517, Luther had 
posted his 95 Theses. As is well known, there he had attacked the church’s crass 
commercialization of salvation through the sale of indulgences. In several 
publications and debates in the next year Luther had challenged the biblical 
integrity of the church’s theology of salvation and the sacraments. On October 8–
9, 1518, Luther had answered a summons to appear in Augsburg before the 
Pope’s representative, Cardinal Cajetan, but had refused to recant his views. On 
November 28, 1518, Luther had appealed directly to the Pope, insisting upon his 
rights, as a professor of theology, to an open hearing of his views at a general 
church council. On July 4–14, 1519, with no such council forthcoming, Luther had 
engaged in a sensational public debate at the University of Leipzig with the 
Catholic theologian Johann Eck over fundamental questions of ecclesiastical 
authority—a debate that revealed the increasing radicalism of Luther’s 
theological doctrines of justification by faith, the primacy of the Bible, the nature 
of the church, and the priesthood of all believers.2 
By then, however, Pope Leo X had issued his bull of excommunication, 
Exsurge, Domine, condemning Luther and his followers: 
Arise, O Lord, and judge your own cause. Remember your 
reproaches to those who are filled with foolishness all through the 
day. Listen to our prayers, for foxes have arisen seeking to destroy 
the vineyard whose winepress you alone have trod. When you were 
about to ascend to your Father, you committed the care, rule, and 
administration of the vineyard, an image of the triumphant church, 
to Peter, as the head and your vicar and his successors. The wild 
boar from the forest seeks to destroy it and every wild beast feeds 
upon it. . . .  Against the Roman Church, lying teachers are rising, 
introducing ruinous sects, and drawing upon themselves speedy 
doom. Their tongues are fire, a restless evil, full of deadly poison. 
 
1 Jaroslav Pelikan and Hartmut T. Lehmann, eds., Luther’s Works (hereafter LW) (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1955-86), 48:186–92. 
2 Scott Hendrix, Luther and the Papacy: Stages in the Reformation Conflict (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1981); Martin Brecht, Martin Luther, trans. James L. Schaaf 
(Philadelphia/Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1985-93), 1:    
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They have bitter zeal, contention in their hearts, and boast and lie 
against the truth.3 
The bull went on to condemn the heretical teachings of that “wild boar” Martin 
Luther as “scandalous,” “offensive,” “seductive,” and “repugnant to Catholic 
truth.” The bull had given Luther sixty days after receipt to recant and return to 
the Catholic fold. December 10, 1520, was the sixtieth day. On that day, Luther 
had his bonfire, burning his last bridge with Rome. 
Luther based his attack on a radical new theology of freedom: freedom of 
the church from the tyranny of the pope, freedom of the laity from the hegemony 
of the clergy, freedom of the conscience from the strictures of canon law. 
“Freedom of the Christian”4 was the rallying cry of the early Lutheran 
Reformation. It drove theologians and jurists, clergy and laity, princes and 
peasants alike to denounce the church’s legal strictures and structures with 
unprecedented alacrity. “One by one, the structures of the church were thrust into 
the glaring light of the Word of God and forced to show their true colors,” 
Jaroslav Pelikan writes.5 Few church structures survived this scrutiny in the 
heady days of the 1520s. The church’s canon law books were burned. Church 
courts were closed. Monasteries were confiscated. Benefices were dissolved. 
Church properties were seized. Clerical privileges were stripped. Mendicant 
begging was banned. Mandatory celibacy was suspended. Indulgence trafficking 
was condemned. Taxes to Rome were outlawed. Ties to the pope were severed. 
The German people who followed Luther were now to live by the pure light of the 
Word of God and the simple law of the local community. 
Although such attacks built on two centuries of reformist agitation in the 
West, it was especially Luther’s theological teachings that ignited this movement 
in Germany. Salvation comes through faith in the gospel, Luther taught, not 
through works of the law. All persons stand directly before God; they are not 
dependent upon clerics for divine mediation. All believers are priests to their 
peers; they are not divided into a higher clergy and lower laity. All persons are 
called by God to serve in vocations; clerics are not the only ones with a Christian 
calling. The church is a communion of saints, not a corporation of law. The 
consciences of its members are guided by the Bible, not governed by traditions. 
The church is called to serve society in love, not to rule it by law. Law is the 
province of the magistrate, not the prerogative of the cleric. When put in such raw 
and radical terms, these theological doctrines of justification by faith, the 
priesthood of believers, law and gospel, and others were highly volatile 
compounds. When sparked by Luther’s pugnacious rhetoric and relentless 
 
3 Carl Mirbt, ed., Quellen zur Geschichte des Papsttums und des römischen Katholizimus, 2d ed. 
(Tübingen/Leipzig: Paul Siebeck, 1911), 183–85. 
4 See Martin Luther, Freedom of a Christian (1520), in LW 31:327–77. 
5 Jaroslav Pelikan, Spirit versus Structure: Luther and the Institutions of the Church (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1968), 5. 
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publications, they set off a whole series of explosive reforms in various parts of 
central Europe. 
In these early years, Luther’s attack on the church’s canon law and clerical 
authority sometimes broadened into an attack on human law and human 
authority. altogether. “Neither pope nor bishop nor any other man has the right to 
impose a single syllable of law upon a Christian man without his consent,” Luther 
famously wrote in 1520. The Bible contains all the law that is needed for proper 
Christian living. To subtract from the law of the Bible is blasphemy. To add to the 
law of the Bible is tyranny. “Wise rulers, side by side with Holy Scripture, [are] 
law enough.” When jurists of the day objected that such radical biblicism was 
itself a recipe for blasphemy and tyranny, Luther turned on them harshly. “Jurists 
are bad Christians,” he declared repeatedly. “Every jurist is an enemy of Christ.” 
When the jurists persisted in their criticisms, Luther reacted with vulgar anger: “I 
shit on the law of the pope and of the emperor, and on the law of the jurists as 
well.”6 
The rapid deconstruction of law, politics, and society that followed upon 
such shrill rhetoric plunged Germany into an acute crisis in the 1520s and 1530s. 
Luther had drawn too sharp a contrast between freedom and order within the 
church. Young Lutheran churches and clerics were treating their new liberty as 
license for all manner of doctrinal and liturgical experimentation and laxness. 
Widespread confusion reigned over preaching, prayers, and pastoral duties. 
Church attendance, tithe payments, and charitable offerings declined abruptly 
among many who took literally Luther’s new teachings of free grace. Many 
radical social experiments were engineered out of Luther’s doctrines of the 
priesthood of believers and justification by faith. 
Moreover, Luther had driven too deep a wedge between the canon law 
and the civil law. Many subjects traditionally governed by the church’s canon law 
remained without effective legal guidance. The vast church properties that local 
magistrates had confiscated were disappearing rapidly into private coffers. 
Drunkenness, usury, and vagabondage reached new heights. Crime, 
delinquency, and mendicancy soared. Schools, charities, and hospitals closed 
down. Marriage, divorce, and inheritance became hopelessly confused. Widows, 
orphans, and the poor were dying in the streets. All these subjects and many 
more, the Catholic canon law and church institutions had governed in detail for 
many centuries in Germany. The new Protestant civil law, where it existed at all, 
was too primitive to address these subjects properly. 
In response, the Lutheran reformation of theology and the church quickly 
broadened into a reformation of law and the state as well. Deconstruction of the 
canon law for the sake of the gospel gave way to reconstruction of the civil law 
on the strength of the gospel. Castigation of Catholic clerics as self-serving 
overlords gave way to cultivation of Protestant magistrates as fathers of the 
 
6 LW 36:70; LW 44:203–04; WA TR 3, no. 2809b, no. 2837, no. 3027; WA 49:302. 
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community called to govern on God’s behalf. Old rivalries between theologians 
and jurists gave way to new alliances, especially in the new Lutheran 
universities. 
In the 1530s and thereafter, Lutheran theologians began to pay much 
closer attention to the legal, political, and social implications of their new 
teachings. They joined Lutheran jurists to craft ambitious legal reforms of church, 
state, and society. These legal reforms were defined and defended in hundreds 
of new writings published by Lutheran theologians and jurists from the 1530s to 
1560s. They were refined and routinized in hundreds of new reformation 
ordinances promulgated by German cities, duchies, and territories that converted 
to the Lutheran cause. 
Critics of the day, and ever since, have criticized this legal turn of the 
Reformation as a corruption of the original Lutheran message. For some, it was a 
bitter betrayal of the new freedom and equality that Luther had promised. For 
others, it was a distortion of Luther’s fundamental reforms of theology and church 
life. For still others, it was a simple reversion to Catholic canonical norms 
dressed in new theological forms. 
Whatever the merits of such criticisms in Luther’s day, it was the 
combination of theological and legal reforms that rendered the Lutheran 
Reformation so resolute and resilient. The reality was that Luther and the 
theologians needed the law and the jurists, however much they scorned them 
initially. It was one thing to deconstruct the framework of medieval Catholic law, 
politics, and society with a sharp theological sword. It was quite another thing to 
reconstruct a new Lutheran framework of law, politics, and society with only this 
theological sword in hand. Luther learned this lesson the hard way in the crisis 
years of the 1520s and 1530s, and it almost destroyed the early Protestant 
movement. He quickly came to realize that law was not just a necessary evil but 
also an essential blessing in this earthly life. 
It was thus both natural and necessary for the Lutheran Reformation to 
move from theology to law. Radical theological reforms had made possible 
fundamental legal reforms. Fundamental legal reforms, in turn, would make 
permanent radical theological reforms. The Lutheran Reformation became in its 
essence both a theological and a legal reform movement. It struck new balances 
between law and gospel, order and faith, structure and spirit. And it offered new 
theories and laws of church and state, marriage and education that have become 
a permanent legacy of the Western tradition. 
Luther’s Two-Kingdoms Theory 
The starting point for this combined theological and legal movement was Luther’s 
complex theory of the two kingdoms. This theory came together in Luther’s mind 
in the later 1520s and 1530s, and became a dominant gene in the genetic code 
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of Lutheran theology and jurisprudence thereafter. God has ordained two 
kingdoms or realms in which humanity is destined to live, Luther argued, the 
earthly kingdom and the heavenly kingdom. The earthly kingdom is the realm of 
creation, of natural and civil life, where a person operates primarily by reason 
and law. The heavenly kingdom is the realm of redemption, of spiritual and 
eternal life, where a person operates primarily by faith and love. These two 
kingdoms embrace parallel heavenly and earthly, spiritual and temporal forms of 
righteousness and justice, government and order, truth and knowledge. But 
these two kingdoms ultimately remain distinct. The earthly kingdom is distorted 
by sin and governed by the law. The heavenly kingdom is renewed by grace and 
guided by the gospel. A Christian is a citizen of both kingdoms at once and 
invariably comes under the distinctive government of each. As a heavenly citizen, 
the Christian remains free in his or her conscience, called to live fully by the light 
of the word of God alone. But as an earthly citizen, the Christian is bound by law, 
and is called to obey the natural orders and offices that God has ordained for the 
governance of this earthly kingdom.7 
Luther’s two-kingdoms theory was a rejection of traditional hierarchical 
theories of being, society, and authority. For centuries, the Catholic Church had 
taught that God’s creation was hierarchical in structure—a vast chain of being 
emanating from God and descending through various levels and layers of reality. 
In this great chain of being, each creature found its place and its purpose, and 
each human society found its natural order and hierarchy. It was thus simply the 
nature of things that some persons and institutions were higher on this chain of 
being and some were lower. It was the nature of things that some were closer 
and had more ready access to God, and some were farther away and in need of 
greater mediation in their relationship with God. This chain-of-being theory, which 
some will recognize in Dante’s Divine Comedy, was one basis for traditional 
Catholic arguments for the superiority of the pope to the emperor, of the clergy to 
the laity, of the canon law to the civil law, of the church to the state.8 
Luther’s two-kingdoms theory turned this traditional ontology on its side. 
By distinguishing the two kingdoms, Luther highlighted the radical separation 
between the Creator and the creation, and between God and humanity. For 
Luther, the fall into sin destroyed the original continuity and communion between 
the Creator and the creation, the organic tie between the heavenly kingdom and 
the earthly kingdom. There was no series of emanations of being from God to 
humanity. There was no stairway of merit from humanity to God. There was no 
purgatory. There was no heavenly hierarchy. God is present in the heavenly 
kingdom, and is revealed in the earthly kingdom mainly through “masks.” 
 
7 See detailed sources for this section in LP, 87–118. 
8 See Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1936). On the legal and ecclesiological implications of this 
ontology, see Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought: 1150-1650 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 8ff. 
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Persons are born into the earthly kingdom, and have access to the heavenly 
kingdom only through faith.9 
Luther did not deny the traditional view that the earthly kingdom retained 
its natural order, despite the fall into sin. There remained, in effect, a chain of 
being, an order of creation, that gave each human being and institution its proper 
place and purpose in this life. But, for Luther, this chain of being was horizontal, 
not hierarchical. Before God, all persons and all institutions in the earthly 
kingdom were by nature equal. Luther’s earthly kingdom was a flat regime, a 
horizontal realm of being, with no person and no institution obstructed or 
mediated by any other in relationship to and accountability before God. 
Social, Political, and Legal Reforms 
Luther’s two-kingdoms theory also turned the traditional hierarchical theory of 
human society on its side. For many centuries, the church had taught that the 
clergy were superior to the laity. The clergy were special officers of the higher 
heavenly realm of grace, while the laity were simply members of the lower earthly 
realm of nature. As members of the higher heavenly realm, the clergy had 
readier access to God and God’s mysteries. They thus mediated the channel of 
grace between the laity and God—dispensing God’s grace through the 
sacraments and preaching, and interceding for God’s grace by hearing 
confessions, receiving charity, and offering prayers on behalf of the laity. In this 
sense, the lowliest cleric was superior to the noblest emperor. All the clergy, from 
the lowliest parson to the greatest pope, were exempt from earthly laws, taxes, 
and other duties, and foreclosed from earthly pursuits such as marriage and 
family life. 
Luther rejected this hierarchical social theory. Clergy and laity were 
fundamentally equal before God and before all others, he argued. Luther’s 
doctrine of the priesthood of all believers at once “laicized” the clergy and 
“clericized” the laity. It treated the traditional “clerical” office of preaching and 
teaching as just one other vocation alongside many others that a conscientious 
Christian could properly and freely pursue. He treated all traditional “lay” offices 
as forms of divine calling and priestly vocation, each providing unique 
opportunities for service to one’s peers. Preachers and teachers of the visible 
church must carry their share of civic duties and pay their share of civil taxes, just 
like everyone else. And they may and should participate in earthly activities such 
as marriage and family life, just like everyone else.10 
 
9 LW 1:66ff., 52; LW 52:57, 79; WA 7:73; LW 33:295ff.; WA TR 1, no. 71; LW 54:71; LW 26:94–
96; LW 14:114; LW 24:67; LW 26:95–96; WA 31/1:437; WA 40/3:271ff. 
10 See detailed sources and discussion in Steven Ozment, The Reformation in the Cities: The 
Appeal of Protestantism to Sixteenth-Century Germany and Switzerland (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1975), 84ff. 
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Luther expanded on this natural egalitarianism with his robust 
understanding of the Christian “calling” (Beruf) or “vocation” (vocatio). Every 
“good, decent, and useful” occupation in which a Christian conscientiously 
engages should be treated as a Christian vocation, Luther believed. Each 
vocation was an equally virtuous and effective calling of God, though none was a 
pathway to salvation. The carpenter and the prince, the mineworker and the 
judge, the housewife and the banker—all should accept their Christian 
responsibility to perform their tasks conscientiously and, so far as possible, in the 
service of God and others.11 Public officials, in particular, Luther argued, have a 
special calling to serve the community. This calling might require them to adopt a 
Christian social ethic that differs from a Christian personal ethic. A Christian’s 
duty in his direct relationship with God “as a private person, a person for himself 
alone,” is to love his enemy and to suffer injustice and abuse from his neighbor 
without resistance and without revenge. As a public person, serving in such 
offices as the military or the judiciary, however, a Christian might well be required 
to resist his neighbor and to avenge injustice and abuse, even to the point of 
violence and bloodshed.12 
Luther did not press his natural egalitarianism to communitarian extremes. 
He saw no incompatibility between insisting on the equal status of all persons 
and vocations before God, and accepting the ample disparities in wealth, power, 
privilege, and respectability among persons and positions in daily life. Some are 
more blessed, some less so. Some work harder, some play more. Some enjoy 
goods, some spurn them. Some start with noble inheritances, some start with 
nothing. Some vocations require more pageantry and property than others. None 
of these empirical disparities, however, changes the fundamental reality of 
human equality before God. 
Political Reforms 
Luther’s two-kingdoms theory also turned the traditional hierarchical theory of 
spiritual and temporal authority on its side. For centuries, the church had taught 
that the pope is the vicar of Christ, in whom Christ has vested the “plentitude of 
his power.” This power was symbolized in the “two swords” discussed in the 
Bible (Luke 22:38)—the spiritual and the temporal swords. Christ had handed 
these two swords to the highest being in the human world—the pope, the vicar of 
Christ. The pope and his clerical delegates wielded the spiritual sword, in part by 
establishing canon laws for the governance of all of Christendom. The pope, 
however, was too holy to wield the temporal sword. He thus delegated this sword 
to those authorities below the spiritual realm—emperors, kings, dukes, and their 
civil retinues. These civil magistrates were to promulgate and enforce civil laws in 
a manner consistent with canon law and other church teachings. Under this two-
swords theory, civil law was by its nature inferior to canon law. Civil jurisdiction 
 
11 See detailed sources and discussion in Gustaf Wingren, The Christian Calling: Luther on 
Vocation, trans. Carl C. Rasmussen (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957). 
12 LW 46:93ff.; LW 21:108–15; LW 46:93–99. 
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was subordinate to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Political authority was subordinate 
to clerical authority. Medieval popes could rarely make good on these grand 
claims to universal, preemptory legal authority in Christendom. Indeed, the 
strongest expressions of the two-swords theory came in the late Middle Ages, 
when the papacy was losing its power and clutching ever more firmly to a waning 
ideal. But the two-swords theory remained a staple of traditional political theory in 
Germany. And a good number of strong German bishops and ecclesiastical 
princes in Luther’s day were still making good on its claims in their local polities.13 
Luther rejected this hierarchical view of government. For Luther, the 
earthly kingdom featured three natural forms and forums of government: the 
domestic, ecclesiastical, and political estates—or, in modern terms, the family, 
the church, and the state. These three institutions stood equal before God, and 
were each called directly by God to discharge complementary tasks in the earthly 
kingdom. The family was called to rear and nurture children, to teach and to 
discipline them, to cultivate and exemplify love and charity within the home and 
the broader community. The church was called to preach the word, to administer 
the sacraments, to discipline their wayward members. The state was called to 
protect peace, punish crime, promote the common good, and to support the 
church, family, and other institutions derived from them. 
Not only were these three estates equal, rather than hierarchical, in 
authority, status, and responsibility, Luther argued. Only the state had legal 
authority—the authority of the sword to pass and enforce positive laws for the 
governance of the earthly kingdom. Contrary to the two-swords theory, Luther 
emphasized that the church was not a law-making authority. The church had no 
sword. It had no jurisdiction. It had no business involving itself in the day-to-day 
administration of law or in the vesting of magistrates in their offices. The church’s 
ministry and mission lay elsewhere. To be sure, each local church needed 
internal rules of order and discipline to govern its members and officers, and 
external legal structures to protect its polity and property. But it was up to the 
local magistrate to pass and enforce these ecclesiastical laws, in consultation 
and cooperation with the local clergy and theologians. And, to be sure, church 
officers and theologians had to be vigilant in preaching and teaching the law of 
God to magistrates and subjects alike, and in pronouncing prophetically against 
injustice, abuse, and tyranny. But formal legal authority lay with the state, not 
with the church.14 
Luther was more concerned with the function than with the form of the 
state. Luther had, at first, hoped that the emperor would endorse the 
Reformation, and accordingly included in his early writings some lofty panegyrics 
on the imperial authorities of the Holy Roman Empire of his day and of the 
 
13 Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, repr. ed., trans. F. W. Maitland 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 7–21; Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas 
(New York: Knopf, 1954), 2:506–38. 
14 LW 45:105ff.; LW 36:106ff. 
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Christian Roman Empire of a millennium before. When the emperor failed him, 
Luther turned at various times to the nobility, the peasantry, the city councils, and 
the princes, and in turn wrote favorably about each of them, and then sometimes 
unfavorably when they failed him.15 Such writings must be read in their 
immediate political context, however, and not used to paint Luther as a theorist of 
political absolutism, or elitist oligarchy, or constitutional democracy. Luther had 
no firm or consistent theory of the forms of political office. He did not sort out 
systematically the relative virtues and vices of monarchy, aristocracy, or 
democracy. He spent very little time on the thorny constitutional questions of the 
nature and purpose of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, let alone finer 
questions of checks and balances, conflict of laws, judicial review, and other 
such topics that occupied other sixteenth-century Protestant and humanist 
writers. These were not Luther’s primary concern. 
Luther was more concerned with the general status and function of the 
political office—both before God and within the community. On the one hand, 
Luther believed, the magistrate was God’s vice-regent in the earthly kingdom, 
called to elaborate and enforce God’s Word and will, to reflect God’s justice and 
judgment on earthly citizens. The magistracy was, in this sense, a “divine office,” 
a “holy estate,” a “Godly calling,” within the earthly kingdom. Indeed, the 
magistrate was a “god” on earth, as Psalm 82:6 put it, to be obeyed as if God 
himself. “Law and earthly government are a great gift of God to mankind,” Luther 
wrote with ample flourish. “Earthly authority is an image, shadow, and figure of 
the dominion of Christ.” Indeed, “a pious jurist” who served faithfully in the 
Christian magistrate’s retinue is “a prophet, priest, angel, and savior . . . in the 
earthly kingdom.”16 The magistrate and his retinue not only represented God’s 
authority and majesty, however. They also exercised God’s judgment and wrath 
against human sin. “Princes and magistrates are the bows and arrows of God,” 
Luther wrote, equipped to hunt down God’s enemies in the earthly kingdom. The 
hand of the Christian magistrate, judge, or soldier “that wields the sword and 
slays is not man’s hand, but God’s; and it is not man, but God, who hangs, 
tortures, beheads, slays, and fights. All these are God’s works and judgments.”17 
On the other hand, Luther believed, the magistrate was the “father of the 
community” (Landesvater, paterpoliticus). He was to care for his political subjects 
as if they were his children, and his political subjects were to “honor” him as if he 
were their parent. This was the essence of the proper authority, Obrigkeit or ordo 
politicus, of the political authorities and their subjects that constitute “the state.” 
Like a loving father, the magistrate was to keep the peace and to protect his 
subjects from threats or violations to their persons, properties, and reputations. 
He was to deter his subjects from abusing themselves through drunkenness, 
 
15 See texts in K. Trüdinger, Luthers Briefe und Gutachten an weltliche Obrigkeit zur 
Durchfuhrung der Reformation (Münster: Aschendorff, 1975); J. M. Porter, ed., Luther—Selected 
Political Writings (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974). 
16 See Porter, Luther,and further texts in LW 2:139ff.; LW 13:44ff.; LW 44:92ff.; LW 45:85ff.; LW 
46:237ff.; WA 30/2:554. 
17 LW 17:171; LW 45:113; LW 46:95ff.; WA 6:267; WA 19:626. 
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sumptuousness, prostitution, gambling, and other vices. He was to nurture and 
sustain his subjects through the community chest, the public almshouse, the 
state-run hospice. He was to educate them through the public school, the public 
library, the public lectern. He was to see to their spiritual needs by supporting the 
ministry of the locally established church, and encouraging their attendance and 
participation through the laws of Sabbath observance, tithing, and holy days. He 
was to see to their material needs by reforming inheritance and property laws to 
ensure more even distribution of the parents’ property among all children. He 
was to set an example of virtue, piety, love, and charity in his own home and 
private life for his faithful subjects to emulate and to respect. The Christian 
magistrate was to complement and support the God-given responsibilities of 
parents and family members for their children and dependents, without intruding 
on the paternal office. And he was to support the preaching and sacramental life 
of the local church without trespassing on the ecclesiastical office, let alone that 
of the invisible church of the heavenly kingdom.18 
These twin metaphors of the Christian magistrate—as the lofty vice-regent 
of God and as the loving father of the community—described the basics of 
Luther’s and, later, Lutheran political theory. For Luther, political authority was 
divine in origin but earthly in operation. It expressed God’s harsh judgment 
against sin but also his tender mercy for sinners. It communicated the law of God 
but also the lore of the local community. It depended upon the church for 
prophetic direction, but it took over from the church all jurisdiction—governance 
of marriage, education, poor relief and other earthly subjects traditionally 
governed by the Catholic Church’s canon law. Either metaphor standing alone 
could be a recipe for abusive tyranny or officious paternalism; but both 
metaphors together provided Luther and his followers with the core ingredients of 
a robust Christian republicanism and budding Christian welfare state. 
Legal Reforms 
Luther’s two-kingdoms theory effectively “flattened” the traditional hierarchical 
theories of being and order, of clergy and laity, of ecclesiastical and political 
authority. His earthly kingdom was a horizontal realm with each person, each 
order, and each official called directly by God to discharge discrete offices and 
vocations. What kept this earthly kingdom and its activities intact, Luther 
believed, was the law of God, and its elaboration by earthly authorities and 
subjects. 
Luther defined the law of God as the set of norms ordained by God in the 
creation, written by God on the hearts of all persons, and rewritten by God on the 
pages of the Bible. Luther called this variously the “law of nature,” “natural law,” 
“divine law,” “Godly law,” “the law of the heart,” “the teachings of conscience,” 
“the inner law,” among others—terms and concepts that he did not clearly 
 
18 LW 13:44ff.; LW 36:106–17; LW 45:85–113; LW 46:225ff. 
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differentiate either from each other or from traditional formulations.19 His main 
point was that God’s natural law set at creation continued to operate after the fall 
into sin, and that it provided the foundation for all positive law and public morality 
in the earthly kingdom. 
The natural law defined the basic obligations that a person owed to God, 
neighbor, and self. The clearest expression of these obligations, for Luther, was 
the Ten Commandments, which God inscribed on two tables and gave to Moses 
on Mount Sinai. The First Table of the Decalogue set out basic obligations to 
honor the Creator God, to respect God’s name, to observe the Sabbath, to avoid 
idolatry and blasphemy. The Second Table set out basic obligations to respect 
one’s neighbor—-to honor authorities, and not to kill, commit adultery, steal, bear 
false witness, or covet. Luther believed this to be a universal statement of the 
natural law binding not only on the Jews of the Old Testament but also on 
everyone. “The Decalogue is not the law of Moses . . . but the Decalogue of the 
whole world, inscribed and engraved in the minds of all men from the foundation 
of the world.” “[W]hoever knows the Ten Commandments perfectly must know all 
the Scriptures, so that, in all affairs and cases, he can advise, help, comfort, 
judge, and decide both spiritual and temporal matters, and is qualified to sit in 
judgment upon all doctrines, estates, spirits, laws, and whatever else is in the 
world.” And again: “[A]lthough the Decalogue was given in a particular way and 
place and ceremony . . . all nations acknowledge that there are sins and 
iniquities.”20 
Knowledge of this natural law comes not only through revealed scripture, 
Luther argued, but also through natural reason—one of those “masks” by which 
the hidden God is partly revealed in the earthly kingdom. Luther built on St. 
Paul’s notion that even the heathens have a “law written in their hearts, their 
conscience also bearing witness” to a natural knowledge of good and evil 
(Romans 2:15). Every rational person thus “feels” and “knows” the law of God, 
even if only obliquely. The basic teaching of the natural law “lives and shines in 
all human reason, and if people would only pay attention to it, what need would 
they have of books, teachers, or of law? For they carry with them in the recesses 
of the heart a living book which would tell them more than enough about what 
they ought to do, judge, accept, and reject.”21 
But sinful persons do not, of their own accord, readily heed the natural law 
written on their hearts, and rewritten in the Bible. Thus, God has called upon 
other persons and authorities in the earthly kingdom to elaborate its basic 
requirements. All Christians, as priests to their peers, must communicate the 
natural law of God by word and by deed. Parents must teach it to their children 
 
19 See the collection of quotations in Hermann W. Beyer, Luther und das Recht: Gottes Gebot, 
Naturrecht, Volksgesetz in Luthers Deutung (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1935); and the detailed 
analysis in Johannes Heckel, Lex charitatis: A Juristic Disquisition on Law in the Theology of 
Martin Luther, trans. Gottfried Krödel (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2010). 
20 LW 44:15–114; WA 39/1:478, 540; WA 18:72; WA 30:192. 
21 WA 17/2:102. 
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and dependents. Preachers must preach it their congregants and catechumens. 
And magistrates must elaborate and enforce it through their positive laws and 
public policies. 
The magistrate’s elaboration and enforcement of the natural law was 
particularly important, Luther believed, since only the magistrate held formal legal 
authority in the earthly kingdom. “Natural law is a practical first principle in the 
realm of public morality,” Luther wrote; “it forbids evil and commands good. 
Positive law is a decision that takes local conditions into account,” and “credibly” 
elaborates the general principles of the natural law into specific precepts to fit 
these local conditions. “The basis of natural law is God, who has created this 
light, but the basis of positive law is the earthly authority,” the magistrate, who 
represents God in this earthly kingdom. The magistrate must promulgate and 
enforce these positive laws by combining faith, reason, and tradition. He must 
pray to God earnestly for wisdom and instruction. He must maintain “an 
untrammeled reason” in judging the needs of his people and the advice of his 
counselors. He must consider the wisdom of the legal tradition—particularly that 
of Roman law, which Luther called a form of “heathen wisdom.” “The polity and 
the economy” of the earthly kingdom, Luther wrote, “are subject to reason. 
Reason has first place. There [one finds] civil laws and civil justice.”22 
But both natural law and positive law had to be applied equitably, Luther 
insisted. “The strictest law [can do] the greatest wrong,” he wrote, citing Cicero. 
Thus, “equity is necessary” in the application of rules of all sorts, whether in the 
state or the church, in the household or the classroom. Any ruler, whatever his 
office, “who does not know how to dissemble does not know how to rule,” Luther 
said pithily. “This is what is meant by [doing] equity (epiekeia).” To apply a rule 
equitably, Luther insisted “is not rashly to relax laws and discipline.” It is, rather, 
to balance firmness and fairness and to recognize circumstances that might 
mitigate against literal application of the rule or that might raise questions that the 
rule does not and perhaps should not reach. In such instances, “equity will weigh 
for or against” strict application of the rule, and a wise ruler will know the juster 
course. “But the weighing must be of such kind that the law is not undermined, 
for no undermining of natural law and divine law must be allowed.”23 
Reforms of Marriage and Education 
Luther and his followers worked to reform not only church and state but also 
marriage and the family, the third of his three natural estates.24 Prior to the 
sixteenth century, marriage was regarded as a sacrament of the church. It was 
formed by the mutual consent of a fit man and a fit woman in good religious 
 
22 WA TR 3, no. 3911; WA 12:243; WA 14:591, 714; WA 16:537; WA 30/2:557; WA 40:305; WA 
51:211, 241–42; LW 45:120–26. 
23 WA TR 3, no. 4178; LW 54:325; WA TR 1, no. 315; LW 54:43–44; WA 14:667ff.; LW 46:100. 
24 For detailed sources on this topic, see LP, 199–256, updated in my From Sacrament to 
Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition, 2nd ed. (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2012), 113–58. 
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standing. It symbolized the enduring union of Christ and his church, and 
conferred sanctifying grace upon the couple and their children. The parties could 
form this union in private, but once properly formed it was an indissoluble bond 
broken only by the death of one of the parties. 
As a sacrament, marriage was subject to the jurisdiction of the medieval 
church. A complex network of canon laws governed sex, marriage, and family life 
in detail, from abortion to euthanasia. The church did not regard the family as its 
most exalted estate, however. Although a sacrament and a sound way of 
Christian living, marriage (and with it, family life) was not considered to be 
spiritually edifying. Marriage was a remedy for sin, not a recipe for righteousness. 
Marriage was considered subordinate to celibacy. Clerics and monastics were 
required to forgo marriage as a condition for ecclesiastical service. Those who 
could not were not worthy of the church’s holy orders and offices. 
Lutheran theologians treated marriage, not as a sacrament of the 
heavenly kingdom, but as a social estate of the earthly kingdom. Marriage, they 
taught, was a natural institution that served the goods of mutual love and support 
of husband and wife, mutual procreation and nurture of children, and mutual 
protection of both spouses from sexual sin. All adult persons, preachers and 
others alike, should pursue the calling of marriage, for all were in need of the 
comforts of marital love and of the protection from sexual sin. Moreover, the 
marital household served as a model of authority, charity, and pedagogy in the 
earthly kingdom and as a vital instrument for the reform of church, state, and civil 
society. Parents served as “bishops” to their children. Siblings served as priests 
to each other. The household altogether was a source of evangelical and 
charitable impulses in society. 
Though divinely created and spiritually edifying, however, marriage 
remained a social estate of the earthly kingdom. All parties could partake of this 
institution, regardless of their faith or lack of it. Though guided by biblical norms 
and clerical counseling, marriage and family life were subject to the rule of the 
state, not the church. Civil magistrates were to set the laws for marriage 
formation, maintenance, and dissolution; child custody, care, and control; family 
property, inheritance, and commerce and more. 
Lutheran magistrates rapidly translated this new Protestant gospel of 
marriage into civil law. They passed new civil marriage laws that shifted marital 
jurisdiction from the church to the state. They strongly encouraged the marriage 
of clergy, discouraged celibacy, and prohibited monasticism. They denied the 
sacramentality of marriage and the religious tests and spiritual impediments 
traditionally imposed on prospective marital couples. They simplified the doctrine 
of consent to betrothal and marriage, and required the participation of parents, 
peers, priests, and political officials in the process of marriage formation and 
dissolution. They sharply curtailed the number of impediments to marriage. And 
 
15 
they introduced absolute divorce on proof of adultery, desertion, and other faults, 
with a subsequent right to remarriage at least for the innocent party. 
The Lutheran reformers soon extended their reforms to schools, which 
Luther called little churches, little states, and little families at once.25 Prior to the 
sixteenth century, schools were dominated by the church. The medieval church 
had established a refined system of religious education for Germany and beyond. 
Cathedrals, monasteries, chantries, ecclesiastical guilds, and large parishes 
offered the principal forms of lower education, governed by general and local 
canon law rules of the church. Gifted graduates were sent on to church-licensed 
universities for advanced training in the core faculties of law, theology, and 
medicine. The vast majority of students, however, were trained for clerical and 
other forms of service in the church. 
The Lutheran Reformation transformed this church-based school system 
into a new system of public schools that allowed each youngster to prepare for 
his or her own distinctive Christian calling. In the reformers’ view, the magistrate, 
as “father of the community,” was primarily responsible for the schooling of his 
political “children.” Education was to be mandatory for boys and girls alike. It was 
to be fiscally and physically accessible to all. It was to be marked by both formal 
classroom instruction and civic education through community libraries, lectures, 
and other media. The curriculum was to combine biblical and evangelical values 
with humanistic and vocational training. Students were to be stratified into 
different classes, according to age and ability, and slowly selected for any 
number of vocations. The public school was to be, in Philip Melanchthon’s 
famous phrase, the “civic seminary” 26 of the commonwealth designed to combine 
deep faith and deep learning. As the Reformation unfolded in Germany, the local 
Protestant magistrate replaced the local Catholic bishop as the chief protector 
and cultivator of the public school and university. The state’s civil law replaced 
the church’s canon law as the chief law governing education. The Bible replaced 
the scholastic text as the chief handbook of the curriculum. German replaced 
Latin as the universal tongue of the educated classes in Germany. The general 
callings of all Christians replaced the special calling of the clergy as the essence 
of education. 
The Cultural and Legal Legacy of the Lutheran Reformation 
Nearly half a millennium after it first broke out in the little town of Wittenberg, the 
Lutheran Reformation still exerts influence on Western theology, law, and culture. 
It is worth recounting the familiar but fundamental changes to German spiritual 
life born of the Reformation. The Lutheran Reformation radically resystematized 
dogma. It truncated the sacraments. It revamped spiritual symbolism. It 
vernacularized the Bible and the worship service. It transformed corporate 
 
25 For detailed sources on this topic, see LP, 257–92. 




worship and congregational music. It gave new emphasis to the pulpit and the 
sermon. It expanded catechesis and religious instruction. It truncated clerical 
privileges and church properties. It dissolved ecclesiastical foundations and 
endowments. It outlawed pilgrimages and the cult of religious artifacts. It rejected 
the veneration of non-biblical saints and the cult of the dead. It outlawed the 
payment of indulgences and mortuaries. It discouraged religious pilgrimages. It 
reduced the number of holy days. It lightened spiritual rules of diet and dress. It 
reformed ecclesiastical discipline and church administration, and much more. A 
leaner, cleaner, more participatory, and more egalitarian church emerged as a 
consequence. 
This theological transformation is one of Germany’s enduring legacies to 
the world. Lutheran and other churches around the world still hold firmly to many 
of the cardinal theological teachings of the Lutheran Reformation, and the great 
Lutheran catechisms, confessions, and creeds forged in the Reformation era ring 
with as much power for many Christians today as they did for Lutherans in the 
1520s and ’30s. The hymns that Luther crafted still lift the rafters of many modern 
Protestant worship services. The art and woodcuts that Luther inspired still bring 
gasps to many modern museum visitors. The Lutheran masterpieces of Johann 
Sebastian Bach and his sons are, many feel, preludes to the music of heaven. 
The timeless language and phrases of Luther’s German Bible and German Mass 
capture the imagination of a modern German as much as the magisterial 
language of the King James Bible and the Book of Common Prayer captures the 
imagination of a modern English literature. 
Much of our modern Western law and politics still bears the unmistakable 
marks of the Lutheran Reformation. Today in every Western legal system and 
well beyond, we protect the freedom of conscience, for which Luther risked his 
life. And we have placed his original understandings of religious freedom, human 
dignity, liberty, and equality at the cornerstones of our constitutional orders. 
Today, in most Western legal systems, marriage is still viewed as both a 
civil and a spiritual institution, as Luther taught, whose formation and dissolution 
require special legal procedures. Parents must still consent to the marriages of 
their minor children. Peers must still attest to the veracity of the marital oath. 
Pastors or political officials must still confirm the marital union, if not consecrate 
it. Divorce and annulment still require a special public proceeding before a 
tribunal, with proof of support for dependent spouses and children. 
Today, in most Western legal systems, basic education remains a 
fundamental right of the citizen to procure and a fundamental duty of the state to 
provide. Literacy and learning are still considered a prerequisite for individual 
flourishing and communal participation. Society still places a heavy burden on 
those who shirk education voluntarily. The state is still the essential monitor of 
civil education, which task it discharges directly through its own public or 
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common schools, or indirectly through its accreditation and supervision of private 
schools. 
Today, in most Western legal systems, care for the poor and needy 
remains an essential office of the state and an essential concern of the citizen. 
The rise of the modern Western welfare state over the past century is in no small 
measure a new institutional expression of the Lutheran ideal of the magistrate as 
the father of the community called to care for all his political children. The 
concurrent rise of the modern philanthropic citizen is, in no small measure, a 
modern institutional expression of Luther’s ideal of the priesthood of all believers, 
each called to give loving service to neighbors. Sixteenth-century Lutherans and 
twenty-first-century Westerners seem to share the assumption that the state has 
a role to play not only in fighting wars, punishing crime, and keeping peace but 
also in providing education and welfare, fostering charity and morality, facilitating 
worship and piety. They also seem to share the assumption that law has not only 
a basic use of coercing citizens to accept a morality of duty but also a higher use 
of inducing citizens to pursue a morality of aspiration. 
Much of our modern Western struggle with law, however, is also part of 
the legal legacy of the Lutheran Reformation. For example, the Lutheran 
reformers removed the church as the spiritual ruler of Germany in expression of 
their founding ideals of religious liberty. But they ultimately anointed the state as 
the new spiritual ruler of Germany in expression of their new doctrines of 
Christian republicanism. Ever since, Germany and other Protestant nations have 
been locked in a bitter legal struggle to come to grips with the legacy of state 
establishments of religion while also allowing religious freedom for all. 
The Lutheran reformers removed the pope who, in their view, impugned 
the Christian conscience, fleeced the sheep of Christendom, and reduced the 
German people to quivering obedience for fear of their eternal life. But the 
reformers ultimately anointed the secular prince as the new vice-regent of God 
on earth, the summus episcopus, with too few constitutional safeguards against 
his tyrannical excesses and too few intellectual resources to support civil 
disobedience, let alone political revolt. 
The Lutheran reformers removed clerics as mediators between God and 
the laity, in expression of St. Peter’s teaching of the priesthood of all believers. 
But they ultimately interposed husbands between God and their wives, in 
expression of St. Paul’s teaching of male headship within the home. The 
Lutheran reformers outlawed monasteries and cloisters. But these reforms also 
ended the vocations of many single women, placing a new premium on the 
vocation of marriage. Ever since, Protestant women have been locked in a bitter 
legal struggle to gain fundamental equality both within the marital household and 




Luther’s legal legacy, therefore, should be neither unduly romanticized nor 
unduly condemned. Those who champion Luther as the father of liberty, equality, 
and fraternity might do well to remember his ample penchant for elitism, statism, 
and chauvinism. Those who see the reformers only as belligerent allies of 
repression and abuse should recognize that they were also benevolent agents of 
education and welfare. Prone as he was to dialectic reasoning, and aware as he 
was of the inherent virtues and vices of human achievements, Luther would likely 
have reached a comparable assessment. 
Such circumspection becomes doubly imperative in drawing connections 
between sixteenth-century Lutheranism and twentieth-century Nazism. It may be 
tempting to follow no small number of scholars who have drawn direct and easy 
lines from Luther to Hitler, from Luther’s 1543 sermon On The Jews and Their 
Lies to Hitler’s slaughter of the Jews in the ghettoes and the death camps. Such 
unfathomable tragedies as the Holocaust demand villains to render them a bit 
more understandable, and so giant a German personality as Luther is a natural 
and easy target to single out.27 
But we need remind ourselves of elementary facts and elementary law 
before drawing this indictment. The elementary facts are that Luther’s late-life 
railings against the Jews were quite in contrast to his earlier solicitude for the 
Jews, and quite in keeping with a millennium and more of vicious anti-Judaism 
and anti-Semitism in the Christian tradition. Luther certainly added his ample 
share of vitriol to this Christian tradition of anti-Semitism, and for that he 
deserves ample condemnation—doubly so, given that he knew his words would 
inspire his followers. But Luther’s words were not as harsh as those of many 
other Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox Christians before and after him who 
condemned the Jews and called for all manner of savage abuses against them. 
And Luther did not act on his words in a way that many Christians before him had 
done, and after him would do in their many campaigns of persecution, 
ghettoization, ostracism, and plain slaughter of the Jews. 
To connect Luther to the horrors of the Holocaust is not only to strain 
elementary facts but also to strain elementary law. The criminal law of homicide 
in most Western jurisdictions provides that a defendant can be indicted for 
homicide only if the victim dies of  within a year and a day of that defendant’s 
actions.  This rule sometimes produces outrageous decisions at the margins—
when victims dies on day 367 or shortly thereafter,, or when defendants glory in 
their escape from liability by the mere accident of chronology. But the point of 
having this clear rule about causation is for a community to have closure. Nearly 
four hundred years elapsed between Luther’s horrible sermon and the Nazis’ 
horrible actions. 
 
27 See summary of recent literature in Eric W. Gritsch, Martin Luther’s Anti-Semitism: Against His 
Better Judgment (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2012). 
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Moreover, an indictment for homicide depends on proof of a clear causal 
chain between the defendant’s culpable action and the victim’s ultimate death. 
The defendant’s action must be the cause-in-fact of the victim’s death—an action 
without which the death would not have occurred. The defendant’s conduct must 
also be the proximate cause of the victim’s death—close enough in time, space, 
and foreseeability, without intervening conduct by third parties. It is 
unquestionable that Luther’s late-life railings against the Jews were a link in the 
chain of causation that ultimately brought on the Holocaust. But it was but one 
link in a causal chain of many thousands of links, and was far removed in time, 
space, and foreseeability from the actual horrors of the Holocaust. 
I do not pass this judgment lightly. My family suffered massive losses 
during the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands, and my parents, aunts, and 
uncles still carry deep scars on their bodies, minds, and souls from the savagery, 
fear, and deprivation that were visited on them in those long years of occupation. 
Perhaps the causal period for genocide, unlike that for homicide, should be 
infinite, not limited to a year and a day.. Perhaps long chains of causation should 
be used to hang in memory, not to exonerate in casuistry, all those Christian hate 
mongers against the Jews, however distant in time and cause from the actual 
events of the Holocaust. Perhaps the counsel of emotion is better than the 
counsel of law to deal with so evil a tragedy. Perhaps so. But for all his rhetorical 
braggadocio, I think Luther would have been as horrified as any of us to see what 
the Holocaust had wrought. In the hundred-plus thick volumes of his writings, 
there is precious little to indicate he would have condoned diabolical savagery of 
this proportion. 
Luther did know political evil in his day, albeit nothing on the scale of the 
Holocaust. Indeed, it was in response to that evil that he crafted his greatest 
hymn, “A Mighty Fortress Is Our God.” His words in this hymn capture many of 
the convictions at the core of his dialectical theology: the contrasts between 
Satan and Christ, body and soul, works and faith, folly and truth, despair and 
hope, death and life, the mortality of the earthly kingdom and the eternity of the 
heavenly kingdom. They also capture Luther’s abiding faith that God and his 
Word ultimately remain in charge of both kingdoms, even if the devil and his 
human minions temporally vie for power in the earthly kingdom. This hymn is 
perhaps the best response to Luther’s own failings and to the failings of 
countless Protestants after him. So, it will get the last word. 
A mighty Fortress is our God, 
A Bulwark never failing; 
Our Helper he amid the flood 
Of mortal ills prevailing: 
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For still our ancient foe 
Doth seek to work us woe; 
His craft and power are great, 
And, armed with cruel hate, 
On earth is not his equal. 
 
Did we in our own strength confide, 
Our striving would be losing; 
Were not the right man on our side, 
The man of God’s own choosing: 
Dost ask who that may be? 
Christ Jesus, it is he; 
Lord Sabaoth his Name, 
From age to age the same, 
And he must win the battle. 
 
And though this world, with devils filled, 
Should threaten to undo us; 
We will not fear, for God hath willed 
His truth to triumph through us: 
The prince of darkness grim, 
We tremble not for him; 
His rage we can endure, 
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For lo! his doom is sure, 
One little word shall fell him. 
 
That word above all earthly powers, 
No thanks to them, abideth; 
The Spirit and the gifts are ours 
Through him who with us sideth: 
Let goods and kindred go, 
This mortal life also; 
The body they may kill: 
God's truth abideth still, 
His kingdom is for ever. 
